課程資訊
課程名稱
 意識導論：意識的神經生物與心理學
Consciousness in Neurobiology and Psychology: an Introduction 
開課學期
 111-1 
授課對象
 理學院  心理學研究所  
授課教師
 謝伯讓 
課號
 Psy5351 
課程識別碼
 227EU2800 
班次
  
學分
 3.0 
全/半年
 半年 
必/選修
 選修 
上課時間
 星期一3,4,5(10:20~13:10) 
上課地點
 北館N206 
備註
 本課程以英語授課。與Dr. Yaron Caspi合開。
總人數上限：40人 
  
課程簡介影片
 
核心能力關聯
 本課程尚未建立核心能力關連
課程大綱
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課程概述

See the English version 

課程目標
 See the English version 
課程要求
  
預期每週課後學習時數
  
Office Hours
 每週一 14:00~16:00 
指定閱讀
  
參考書目
  
評量方式
(僅供參考)
    
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
Week 1
 9/5  (i) Introduction – What is all the buzz about?
(ii) History – -The long and convoluted history of the Scientific Study of Consciousness

In this meeting, we will provide a general discussion about the course targets and explore the history of the study of consciousness in the 19th century and the second half of the 20th century.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Anil K. Seth, Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next), Brain and Neuroscience Advances (2018), 2: 1-6, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/2398212818816
II. Hermann Von Helmholtz, The Facts of Perception (1878) from Selected Writings of Hermann Helmholtz
III. Wilhelm Wundt, Central Innervation and Consciousness, Mind (1876), 1, (2): 161-178,
IV. Robert H. Wozniak, Mind and Body, From René Descartes to William James (1992), pp. 39-45
V. Freud (1895), Project for a scientific psychology
VI. Irvin Rock and Stephen Palmer, The Legacy of Gestalt Psychology, Scientific American (1990), 263 (6): 84-91, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24997014
VII. Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Split Brain Revisited, Scientific American (1998), 279 (1): 50-55, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26057845
VIII. Gazzaniga, M. Forty-five years of split-brain research and still going strong. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6: 653–659 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1723
IX. Libet et al., Production of Threshold Levels Conscious Sensation By Electrical Stimulation Of Human Somatosensory Cortex, J Neurophysiol (1963) , 546-572, in: Neurophysiology of Consciousness. Contemporary Neuroscientists. Birkhäuser, Boston (1993), MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0355-1_1
X. Libet, Prologue, in: Neurophysiology of Consciousness. Contemporary Neuroscientists. Birkhäuser, Boston (1993), xviii - xxvii
XI. Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis
XII. Francis Crick and Christof Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness, seminars in Neurosciences (1990), 12:263-275, https://authors.library.caltech.edu/40352/ 
Week 2
 9/12  The ‘what is it like’ – On bats, qualia, Neglect, Blindsight, and Access.

This meeting will begin with discussing the most basic unit that defines the problem of conciseness – the qualia. Following, we will discuss some outstanding phenomena such as blindsight, neglect, and Synesthesia. We will end up by considering the implications of these phenomena to our understanding of consciousness.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Brian Keeley, Early History of the Quale, Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, J. Symons & P. Calvo, eds., London: Routledge (2009), pp. 71-89
II. Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, Philosophical Review (1974), 4:435-50, https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674594623
III. Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, The Philosophical Quarterly (1982), 32 (127):127-136, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960077
IV. Morten Overgaard, Visual experience and blindsight: a methodological review, Experimental Brain Reseaqrch (2011), 209:473–479, http://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-011-2578-2
V. Petra Stoerig, Blindsight, conscious vision, and the role of primary visual cortex, progress, Progress in Brain Research (2006) 155 (B): 217-234 https://doi.org/0.1016/S0079-6123(06)55012-5
VI. Petra Stoerig and Alan Cowey, Blindsight, Current Biology (2007), 17 (19), R822-R824, http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.07.016
VII. Robert Drafal, Neglect, Current Opinion in Neurobiology (1994), 4 (2): 231-236, https://doi.org/10.1016/0959-4388(94)90078-7
VIII. Darren S.J. Ting, Alex Pollock, Gordon N. Dutton, Fergus N. Doubal, Daniel S.W. Ting, Michelle Thompson, Baljean Dhillon, Visual Neglect Following Stroke: Current Concepts and Future Focus, Survey of Ophthalmology (2011), 56 (2): 114-134, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.survophthal.2010.08.001
IX. Jamie Ward, Synesthesia, Annual Review of Psychology (2013), 64:49-75, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143840
X. Paul Bach-y-Rita Stephen W. Kercel, Sensory substitution and the human–machine interface, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2003, 7 (12): 541-546, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2003.10.013
XI. Ned Block, On a confusion about a function of consciousness, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1995), 18(2): 227-247. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00038188
XII. Lionel Naccache, Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness (2018), Philosophical Transaction Royal Society B 373: 20170357-20170357 http://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0357 
Week 3
 9/19  3. Philosophy – From Cartesian dualism to Property Dualism - (and don’t forget Zombies and the HARD PROBLEM.)

In this meeting, we will discuss some philosophical theories and arguments in the philosophy of mind that are still discussed within the scientific study of consciousness community.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. René Descartes (1641), Meditations on First Philosophy.
II. David K. Lewis, An Argument for the Identity Theory, The Journal of Philosophy (1966), 63 (1):17-25, https://doi.org/10.2307/2024524
III. Hilary Putnam, Psychological Predicates, in W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press (1967), 37–48. Reprinted as the Nature of Mental States, in Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, 1975, 429-440
IV. Tomas Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals Are Automata, and Its History, Nature (1874), 10: 362–366, https://doi.org/10.1038/010362a0
V. Frank Jackson, What Mary Didn't Know, The Journal of Philosophy (1986), 83 (5): 291-295, https://doi.org/10.2307/2026143
VI. David Chalmers (1996), The consciousness mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
VII. Patricia Smith Churchland, Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (1994), 67 (4): 23-40, https://doi.org/10.2307/3130741
VIII. John R. Searle, How to study consciousness scientifically, Philosophical Transaction Royal Society London B (1998) 353: 1935-1942, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1998.0346
IX. Daniel C. Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne, Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain, Behavioral And Brain Sciences (1992), 15: 183-247, https://doi.org/:10.1017/S0140525X00068229 
Week 4
 9/26  Phenomenology – James’s consciousness stream, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, and Dennet’s Hetrophenomenology

In this meeting, we will discuss the work of some key theoreticians of consciousness, particularly those who take first-person psychology as their starting point for understanding consciousness and those who take third-person psychology as the starting point. This discussion will help distinguish between the two forms of conscious study (first-person and third-person).

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), Phenomenology of Perception
II. Evan Thompson and Dan Zahavi ,Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology, in The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (2007), Edited by Philip David Zelazo, and Morris Moscovitch, pp 67- 87
III. William James, Principles of Psychology (1918), Vol I
IV. Daniel C. Dennet (1991) – Consciousness Explained 
Week 5
 10/3  Unconsciousness – The Cognitive Unconsciousness, the Affective Unconsciousness and all that jazz

Many of the processes that compose our mental life are executed unconsciously. What is the breadth of these processes? Can any process be executed unconsciously? To start answering these questions, in this meeting, we discuss some important evidence for unconscious processing in the brain from the level of perception and cognition, through the level of affectivity, to the social level.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Johnf.Kihlstrom, The Cognitive Unconscious, Science, Science (1987) 237 (4821): 1445-1452, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3629249
II. John F. Kihlstrom, Perception Without Awareness of What Is Perceived, Learning Without Awareness of What Is Learned, in: Velmans, M. (Ed.), The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews (1996):23-46
III. Ap Dijksterhuis, Henk Aarts, and Pamela K. Smith, The Power of the Subliminal: On Subliminal Persuasion and Other Potential Applications, In: Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman, John A. Bargh Ed., The New Unconscious (2005): 76-106
IV. Kouider Sid and Dehaene Stanislas, Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: a critical review of visual masking, Philosophical Transaction Royal Society B (2007), 362: 857–875 http://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2007.2093
V. Simon van Gaal, Floris P. de Lange, and Michael X Cohen, The role of consciousness in cognitive control and decision making, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (2012), 6:121 https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00121
VI. Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Revolution: Reconceiving the Relation Between Conscious and Unconscious, American Psychologist (2017), 72 (9): 861– 871 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/amp0000238
VII. Heather A. Berlin, The Neural Basis of the Dynamic Unconscious, Neuropsychoanalysis (2011),13 (1): 5-31, https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2011.10773654
VIII. Ryan Smith, Richard D. Lane, Unconscious emotion: A cognitive neuroscientific perspective, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews(2016), 69: 216–238, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.08.013
IX. John A. Bargh, Our unconscious mind, Scientific American (2014), 310, (1): 30-37, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26039731
X. Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L., The mind in the middle: A practical guide to priming and automaticity research. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology (2014): 311–344. 
Week 6
 10/17  Visual Illusions – Filling the gaps with Ebbinghaus, Müller-Lyer, and Kanizsa, and non-detecting the detectable.

In this meeting, we will continue our exploration of the zoo of phenomena that constitute our conscious perception. In particular, we will concentrate on some important visual illusions and ask what they tell us about conscious perception under normal conditions. We will also explore a bit of the visual system.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Melvyn A. Goodale, A. David Milner, Separate visual pathways for perception and action, Trends in Neurosciences (1992), 15, (1): 20-25, https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-2236(92)90344-8
II. Richard L. Gregory, Visual illusions classified, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (1997), 1 (5), 190-194, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(97)01060-7
III. Fiona Macpherson and Clare Batty, Redefining Illusion And Hallucination In Light Of New Cases, Philosophical Issues, 26, Knowledge and Mind, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12086
IV. V. S. Ramachandran & R. L. Gregory, Perceptual filling in of artificially induced scotomas in human vision (1991), Nature, 350, 699-702, https://doi.org/10.1038/350699a0
V. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Perceiving Shape from Shading, Scientific American (1988), Vol. 259 (2): 76-83, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24989197?seq=1
VI. Alva Noë, Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?, Journal of Consciousness Studies (2002), 9 (5-6): 1-12, https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/f0020005/1283
VII. Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, Psychologische Forschung (1967), 31: XVIII—XXX, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00422382
VIII. Daniel J. Simons and Ronald A. Rensink, Change blindness: past, present, and future, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2005), 9 (1), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.11.006
IX. Inattentional blindness: Looking without seeing, Current directions in psychological science (2003), 12 (5),180-184, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.01256
X. Frank Tong, Ming Meng, and Randolph Blake, Neural bases of binocular rivalry, Trends in cognitive science (2006), 10 (11): 502-511 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.003 
Week 7
 10/24  Attention and Awareness – Can two walk together, except they be agreed?

In this meeting, we will discuss one of the main contributors to the brain processes of awareness – that of attention. The relationship between attention and conscious perception is old, and at some point, they were even considered identical by some researchers. Nevertheless, they are most probably distinct brain processes. We will touch upon evidence that they are separate processes and mention some experimental paradigms relevant to the distinction. Finally, we will mention a theory of consciousness that attempts to pin down the nature of consciousness through its relationship with attention.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. MichaelI.Posner, Attention: The mechanisms of consciousness, proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA (1994), 91 (16): 7398-7403, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.91.16.7398
II. Christof Koch Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Attention and consciousness: related yet different, Trends in cognitive sciences (2012), 16 (2):103-105 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.012
III. Michael A.Cohen, Patrick Cavanagh, Marvin M.Chun, Ken Nakayama, The attentional requirements of consciousness, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2012), 16 (8): 411-417, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.06.013
IV. Andrea Nani, Jordi Manuello, Lorenzo Mancuso, Donato Liloia, Tommaso Costa, and Franco Cauda, The Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Attention: Two Sister Processes of the Brain, Frontiers in Neuroscience (2019), 13, 1169, https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2019.01169
V. Nilli Lavie, Diane M. Beck, and Nikos Konstantinou, Blinded by the load: attention, awarenessand the role of perceptual load, Philosophical Transactions Royal Society B (2014), 369: 20130205.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0205
VI. Alexander Maier and Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Growing evidence for separate neural mechanisms for attention and consciousness, Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics (2021) 83:558–576 https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-020-02146-4
VII. Sander Martens and Brad Wyble, The attentional blink: Past, present, and future of a blind spot in perceptual awareness, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews (2010), 34: 947–957, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.12.005
VIII. Peng Zhang, Keith Jamison, Stephen Engel, Bin He, and Sheng He, Binocular Rivalry Requires Visual Attention, Neuron (2011), 71, 362–369, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.05.035
IX. Yoram S. Bonneh, Alexander Cooperman & Dov Sagi, Motion-induced blindness in normal observers, Nature (2001), 411: 798–801, https://doi.org/10.1038/35081073
X. Taylor W. Webb and Michael S. A. Graziano, The attention schema theory: a mechanistic account of subjective awareness, Frontiers in Psychology (2015), 6:500 https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500 
Week 8
 10/31  Volition and Action – The rise and fall of the Libet’s experiment?

In this meeting, we will discuss what might be the most urgent question that is related to the monist materialist stance on consciousness – that of free will. If consciousness is a product of the brain and the brain is a non-quantum physical entity, what is the state of free will? In particular, we will present the discussion about the readiness potential and the Libet’s experiment, from its presentation to the current understanding of the neurological processes involved in volition and action.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright And Dennis K. Pearl. Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential). Brain (1983), 106: 623-642, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0355-1_15
II. Benjamin Libet, Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action, The Behavioral And Brain Sciences (1985) 8: 529-566, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00044903
III. Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will, Journal of Consciousness Studies (1999), 6 (8–9): 47–57
IV. Daniel M. Wegner, The mind’s best trick: how we experience conscious will, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2003), 7 (2): 65-69, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00002-0
V. Haggard, P. Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2008), 9: 934–946 https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2497
VI. Patrick Haggard, The Neurocognitive Bases of Human Volition, Annual Review of Psychology (2019), 70: 9-28, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-103348
VII. Aaron Schurger, Jacobo D. Sitt, and Stanislas Dehaene, An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement, Proceeding of the National Academy of Science USA (2012), 109 (42): E2904-E2913, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1210467109
VIII. Aaron Schurger, Pengbo 'Ben' Hu, Joanna Pak Adina L.Roskies, Trennds in Cognitives Sciences (2021), 25 (7): 558-570, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2021.04.001
IX. Moritz Nicolai Braun, Janet Wessler, Malte Friese, A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews (2021), 128:182–198, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.06.018
X. Edward J. Neafsey, Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet’s clock, Consciousness and Cognition (2021) 94: 103171, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2021.103171
XI. Itzhak Fried, Roy Mukamel, Gabriel Kreiman, Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition (2011), 69 (3): 548-562, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045
XII. Marcel Brass, Ariel Furstenberg , Alfred R. Mele, Why neuroscience does not disprove free will, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews (2019), 102: 251–263, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.04.024 
Week 9
 11/7  The Neural Correlate of Consciousness – Correlation is not causation.

The contemporary scientific study of consciousness started with an elementary idea in mind. Let us examine some mental processes, once when they are conducted unconsciously and once when they are conducted consciously. If we look at the brain under these two conditions, we will be able to identify the brain mechanism responsible for consciousness. These are the neural correlates of consciousness. However, the story turned out to be a bit more complex. In this meeting, we will present the concept of Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) and ask what the NCC really tells us.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Geraint Rees, Gabriel Kreiman, and Christof Koch, Neural Correlates Of Consciousness In Humans, Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2002), 3: 261-270, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn783
II. Francis Crick and Christof Koch, A framework for consciousness, nature neuroscience (2003), 6 (2): 119-126, https://doi.org/10.1038/nn0203-119
III. Giulio Tononi and Christof Koch, The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: An Update, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (2008), 1124: 239-261, https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1440.004
IV. Christof Koch, Marcello Massimini, Melanie Boly, and Giulio Tononi, Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems. Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2016) , 17: 307–321, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2016.22
V. Tom A. de Graaf , Po-Jang Hsieh , Alexander T. Sack, The ‘correlates’ in neural correlates of consciousness, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews (2012), 36: 191–197, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.05.012
VI. Jaan Aru, Talis Bachmann, Wolf Singer, Lucia Mellon, Distilling the neural correlates of consciousness, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews (2012), 36: 737–746, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.003
VII. Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Melanie Wilke, Stefan Frässle and Victor A.F. Lamme, No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2015), 19 (12): 757-770, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002
VIII. George A.Mashour and Anthony G.Hudetz, Neural Correlates of Unconsciousness in Large-Scale Brain Networks, Trends in Neuroscience (2018), 41 (3):150-160, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2018.01.003
IX. Nicholas Humphrey, How to solve the mind-body problem, Journal of Consciousness
Studies (2000), 7 (4): 5-20, https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2000/00000007/00000004/1006
X. Alva Noë and Evan Thompsonm, Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies (2004), 11 (1): 3–28, https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/00000001/1400
XI. Andy Clark, Rediscovering the Brain, in Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (2008), pp. 140-168, https://10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.003.0007 
Week 10
 11/14  Theories of Consciousness – The fervent and hot debate – is it occipital or frontal? GWT (Global Workspace Theories), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Higher-Order Theories (HOT)

Many neuroscientists who study consciousness believe that the ultimate goal of studying consciousness is to develop a theory that will explain what consciousness is. Indeed, many theories of consciousness were suggested over the years but not has gained a consensual position. In this meeting, we will discuss some of the best-known candidates for accounting as a theory of consciousness. Next, we will dwell on the state of the theoretical attempts these days, especially concerning attempts to put them into an empirical trial together.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Bernard J.Baars, Global workspace theory of consciousness: toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience, Progress in Brain Research (2005), 150: 45-53, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50004-9
II. Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Experimental and Theoretical Approaches to Conscious Processing, Neuron (2011), 70: 200–227, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018
III. George A. Mashour, Pieter Roelfsema, Jean-Pierre Changeux, and Stanislas Dehaene, Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis, Neuron (2020), 105 (5): 776-798 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026
IV. Tononi, G. Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto. Biological Bulletin (2008), 215: 216–242, https://doi.org/10.2307/25470707
V. Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini and Christof Koch, Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate, Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2016), 17: 450-461, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2016.44
VI. Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis, Giulio Tononi, From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0, PLOS Computational Biology (2014), 10(5): e1003588. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588
VII. Hakwan Lau, David Rosenthal, Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2011), 15 (8): 365-373, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009
VIII. Richard Brown, Hakwan Lau, and Joseph E. LeDoux, Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2019), 23 (9), 754-768, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.009
IX. Axel Cleeremans, Dalila Achoui, Arnaud Beauny, Lars Keuninckx, Jean-RemyMartin, Santiago Muñoz-Moldes, Laurène Vuillaume Adélaïdede Heering, Learning to Be Conscious, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2020), 24 (2): 112-123, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.11.011
X. Georg Northoff and Victor Lamme,, Neural signs and mechanisms of consciousness: Is there a potential convergence of theories of consciousness in sight?, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews (2020), 118: 568–587, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.07.019
XI. Melloni Lucia, Mudrik Liad, Pitts Michael, Koch Christof, Making the Hard Problem Easier, Science (2021), 372 (6545): 911-912 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abj3259
XII. Itay Yaron, Lucia Melloni,Michael Pitts and Liad Mudrik, The ConTraSt database for analysing and comparing empirical studies of consciousness theories, Nature Human Behaviour (2022), 6: 593–604, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01284-5
XIII. Anil K. Seth and Tim Bayne, Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2022), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4
XIV. A. Demertzi, E. Tagliazucchi, S. Dehaene, G. Dec, P. Barttfeld, F. Raimondo, C. Martial, D. Fernández-Espejo, B. Rohaut,H. U. Voss, N. D. Schiff, A. M. Owen, S. Laureys, L. Naccache, J. D. Sitt, Human consciousness is supported by dynamic complex patterns of brain signal coordination, Science Advance (2019), 5 (2): aat7603, https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aat7603 
Week 11
 11/21  Predictive processing – Bayes, errors, and action preparation – are worms, bacteria, and trees conscious?

In recent years, a new approach to the study of the brain has spread among cognitive scientists. It is called predictive coding and is based on the assumption that the brain is operating as an interference machine, something like a Bayesian prediction machine. Can this framework help to understand consciousness? Some scientists think that it can. In this meeting, we will present this framework, discuss its relationships to consciousness and continue with discussions concerning the question of which biological creatures are conscious and which are not.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Andy Clark, Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science, Behavioral And Brain Sciences (2013), 36(3), 181-204, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12000477
II. Karl Friston, Does predictive coding have a future? Nature Neuroscience (2018) 21, 1019–1021, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41593-018-0200-7
III. Jakob Hohwy Anil Seth, Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (2020), 1(II), 3. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.II.64
IV. Karl Friston and Stefan Kiebel, Philosophical Transaction Royal Society London B Biological Sciences (2009), 364(1521): 1211–1221, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0300
V. Wiktor Rorot, Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model, Neuroscience of Consciousness (2021), 7(2), 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab038
VI. Wanja Wiese & Thomas Metzinger, Vanilla PP for Philosophers: A Primer on Predictive Processing, in T. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.). Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 1. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958573024
VII. Anil K. Seth and Karl J. Friston, Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain, Philosophical Transaction Royal Society B (2016), 371: 20160007, http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0007
VIII. Andrew B. Barron and Colin Klein, What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2016), 113, 18: 4900-4908, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.152008411
IX. Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt, The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago, Frontiers in Psychology, (2013), 4: 667 https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00667
X. Paco Calvo and Karl Friston, Predicting green: really radical (plant) predictive processing, Journal of The Royal Society Interface (2017) 14 (131): 20170096, https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2017.0096 
Week 12
 11/28  Animal consciousness – A tale of a fish and his mirror, a tale of a baby and a drink, and a tale of the forbidden act behind the rock.

In a recent lecture at the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness conference, the Historian Yuval Noah Harari claimed that the hallmark of a theory of consciousness is if it can tell us which animals have conscious experience. The reason is that it might influence our ethical practices toward the world of the living. But which have? This task is a task that many scientists are trying to take. Yet a good understanding of animals' minds and their conscious experience is still lacking. In this meeting, we will discuss some evidence for animal consciousness and its extant.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. David B. Edelman, Bernard J. Baars, Anil K. Seth, Identifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species, Consciousness and Cognition (2005), 14:169–187, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.09.001
II. Melanie Boly, Anil K. Seth, Melanie Wilke, Paul Ingmundson, Bernard Baars,
Steven Laureys, David B. Edelman and Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions, Frontiers in Psychology, (2013), 4: 625 https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00625
III. Colin Allen and Michael Trestman, Animal Consciousness, in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness 2nd edition (2017), Edited by Susan Schneider and Max Velmans pp. 63-76, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119132363
IV. Jonathan Birch, Alexandra K. Schnell and Nicola S. Clayton, Dimensions of Animal Consciousness, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2020), 24(10): 789-801, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.007
V. Jaak Panksepp, Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans, Consciousness and Cognition (2005), 14 (1): 30-80, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.004
VI. Masanori Kohda, Takashi Hotta, Tomohiro Takeyama, Satoshi Awata,Hirokazu Tanaka, Jun-ya Asai, Alex L. Jordan, If a fish can pass the mark test, what are the implications for consciousness and self-awareness testing in animals? PLoS Biology 17(2): e3000021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3000021
VII. Brian Key, Fish do not feel pain and its implications for understanding phenomenal consciousness, Biological Philosophy (2015), 30:149–165, https:doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9469-4
VIII. Consciousness in Jawless Fishes, Front. System Neuroscience. 15:751876, https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2021.751876
IX. Derek C Penn and Daniel J Povinelli, On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind’, Philosophical Transaction Royal Society London B Biological Sciences (2007), 362(1480): 731–744, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2006.2023
X. Krupenye, C, Call, J. Theory of mind in animals: Current and future directions. WIREs Cognitive Science (2019), 10:e1503. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1503
XI. Beatrice T. Gardner, R. Allen Gardner, Two-Way Communication with an Infant Chimpanzee, Behavior of Nonhuman Primates (1971), 4:117-184, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-629104-9.50010-8
XII. J.E.C.Adriaensea, S.E.Koski, L.Huber, C. Lamm, Challenges in the comparative study of empathy and related phenomena in animals, Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews (2020), 112 :62-82, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.01.021 
Week 13
 12/5  Sleep, lucid dreams, anesthesia, and disorders of consciousness – If “Consciousness are states of sentience or awareness that typically begin when we wake up in the morning from a dreamless sleep and continue throughout the day until we fall asleep again. (John Searle)”, what happens when it subsides?

Consciousness may be defined relative to unconscious perception processing in the brain. By contrast, it may also be defined relative to cases where it subsides. These two facet of the terms are usually referred to as the differentiation between levels and content. In this meeting, we will look at the levels of consciousness and discuss the possible implications of cases where the level of consciousness changes to our understanding of the phenomenon of consciousness.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. J. Allan Hobson, States of Consciousness Waking, Sleeping, and Dreaming, in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness 2nd edition (2017), Edited by Susan Schneider and Max Velmans pp. 127-140, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119132363
II. Daniel C. Dennett, The Philosophical Review (1976), 85 (2): 151-171, https://www.pdcnet.org/phr/content/phr_1976_0085_0002_0151_0171
III. Consciousness in sleep: How findings from sleep and dream research challenge our understanding of sleep, waking, and consciousness, Philosophy Compass.(2020), 15: e12661, https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12661
IV. Francesca Siclari, Benjamin Baird, Lampros Perogamvros, Giulio Bernardi, Joshua J LaRocque, Brady Riedner, Melanie Boly, Bradley R Postle & Giulio Tononi, The neural correlates of dreaming, Nature Neuroscience (2017), 20 (6): 872-878, https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.4545
V. Benjamin Baird, Sergio A. Mota-Rolim, Martin Dresler, The cognitive neuroscience of lucid dreaming, Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews (2019), 100: 305-323, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.03.008
VI. Martin Dresler, Renate Wehrle, Victor I. Spoormaker, Stefan P. Koch, Florian Holsboer, Axel Steiger, Hellmuth Obrig, Philipp G. Sämann, Michael Czisch, Neural Correlates of Dream Lucidity Obtained from Contrasting Lucid versus Non-Lucid REM Sleep: A Combined EEG/fMRI Case Study, Sleep, (2012), 35 (7):1017–1020, https://doi.org/10.5665/sleep.1974
VII. Michael T. Alkire, Anthony G. Hudetz, and Giulio Tononi, Consciousness and Anesthesia, Science (2008), 322 (5903): 876-880, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1149213
VIII. Steven Laureys, The neural correlate of (un)awareness: lessons from the vegetative, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2005) 9 (12): 556-559, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.010
IX. Joseph T. Giacino, Joseph J. Fins, Steven Laureys and Nicholas D. Schiff, Disorders of consciousness after acquired brain injury: the state of the science, Nature Reviews Neurology (2014), 10: 99–114, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrneurol.2013.279
X. Marie-Aurelie Bruno, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Aurore Thibaut, Gustave Moonen, andSteven Laureys, From unresponsive wakefulness to minimally conscious PLUS and functional locked-in syndromes: recent advances in our understanding of disorders of consciousness. Medical Progress in the Journal of Neurology (2011), 258: 1373–1384, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00415-011-6114-x
XI. Bonhomme Vincent, Staquet Cécile, Montupil Javier, Defresne Aline, Kirsch Murielle, Martial Charlotte, Vanhaudenhuyse Audrey, Chatelle Camille, Larroque Stephen Karl, Raimondo Federico, Demertzi Athena, Bodart Olivier, Laureys Steven, Gosseries Olivia, General Anesthesia: A Probe to Explore Consciousness, Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience (2019), 13:36 https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2019.00036
XII. Simone Sarasso, Melanie Boly, Martino Napolitani, Olivia Gosseries, Vanessa Charland-Verville, Silvia Casarotto, Mario Rosanova, Adenauer Girardi Casali, Jean-Francois Brichant, Pierre Boveroux, Steffen Rex, Giulio Tononi, Steven Laureys, Marcello Massimini, Consciousness and Complexity during Unresponsiveness Induced by Propofol, Xenon, and Ketamine, Current Biology (2015), 25 (23): 3099-3105, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.10.014
XIII. Tim Bayne, Jakob Hohwy, and Adrian M. Owen, Are There Levels of Consciousness?, Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2016), 20 (6): 405-413, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.009 
Week 14
 12/12  Machine consciousness – From the Chinese Room to Deep Convoluted Neural Networks and organoid

Unless you believe in some version of Panpsychism, as much as we know, consciousness is a biological phenomenon. We might argue which animal possess which type of conscious experience (it at all), but humans are certainly conscious. But should it be so? Could machines be conscious? And how would we know? The answer is that we do not know. Nevertheless, in this meeting, we will examine several examples and arguments relevant to the question – can a machine be conscious?

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. A. M. Turing Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind (1950) , 49: 433-460.
II. John R. Searle, Minds, brains, and programs, The Behavioral And Brain Sciences (1980) 3,417-457, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756
III. Sven Behnke, Humanoid Robots – From Fiction to Reality? (2008), KI-Zeitschrift, 4 (08): 5-9
IV. Stanislas Dehaene, Hakwan Lau, and Sid Kouider, What is consciousness, and could machines have it? Science (2017), 358(6362): 486 492, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aan8871
V. Brenden M. Lake, Tomer D. Ullman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, and Samuel J. Gershman, Building machines that learn and think like people. Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2017), 40: E253, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X16001837
VI. Christof Koch; Giulio Tononi, Can machines be conscious?, in IEEE Spectrum (2008), 45 (6): 55-59, https://doi.org/10.1109/MSPEC.2008.4531463
VII. Susan Blackmore, Consciousness in Meme Machines, journal of Consciousness Studies (2003), 10 (4–5), 19-30, https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/f0020004/1344
VIII. Chris Reed, Argument technology for debating with humans, Nature (2021) 591 (18): 373-374, https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-00539-5
IX. James A. Reggia, The rise of machine consciousness: Studying consciousness with computational models, Neural Networks (2013), 44: 112-131, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2013.03.011
X. Cameron Buckner, Deep learning: A philosophical introduction, philosophy Compass (2019),14: e12625. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12625
XI. Cleber A. Trujillo, Richard Gao, Priscilla D. Negraes, Jing Gu, Justin Buchanan, Sebastian Preissl, Allen Wang, Wei Wu, Gabriel G. Haddad, Isaac A. Chaim, Alain Domissy, Matthieu Vandenberghe, Anna Devor, Gene W. Yeo, Bradley Voytek, and Alysson R. Muotri, Complex Oscillatory Waves Emerging from Cortical Organoids Model Early Human Brain Network Development, Cell Stem Cell (2019), 25, 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.stem.2019.08.002 
Week 15
 12/19  Altered States of consciousness – Why can’t we just stay with Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds?

Can we change our consciousness? Innumerable people during history have been engaged in answering this question. For example, in almost every culture studied (to the best of my knowledge), people consumed consciousness alerting substances. Similarly, in many cultures, people are busy practicing long and tedious methods to get a hold of the ability to control their conscious perception and self-conscious feeling. Together with phenomena such as dreams and hypnosis, it led to the development of the concept of altered states of consciousness. According to this framework, day-to-day waking consciousness is just one state among many others. Each one of them can be classified according to its unique features. But what happens in the brain when consciousness changes? In this meeting, we will present the concept of altered states of consciousness and discuss some neurobiological substrates of consciousness alteration in three different cases. Namely, we will look at the brain while consuming psychedelic drugs, during hypnosis, and during meditation.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Arnold M. Ludwig, Altered States of Consciousness, Archives General Psychiatry (1966), 15(3): 225-234. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.1966.01730150001001
II. Raphaël Millière, Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Leor Roseman, Fynn-Mathis Trautwein and Aviva Berkovich-Ohana, Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness, Frontiers in Psychology (2018), 9:1475.https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01475
III. R. L. Carhart-Harris and K. J. Friston, REBUS and the Anarchic Brain: Toward a Unified Model of the Brain Action of Psychedelics Pharmacological Reviews (2019), 71 (3): 316-344; https://doi.org/10.1124/pr.118.017160
IV. Psychedelic drugs: neurobiology and potential for treatment of psychiatric disorders. Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2020), 21: 611–624, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-020-0367-2
V. Michael M. Schartner, Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Adam B. Barrett, Anil K. Seth &
Suresh D. Muthukumaraswamy, Increased spontaneous MEG signal diversity for psychoactive doses of ketamine, LSD and psilocybin. Scientific Reports (2017), 7: 46421 https://doi.org/10.1038/srep46421
VI. Katrin H. Preller, Adeel Razi, Peter Zeidman, Philipp Stämpfli, Karl J. Friston and Franz X. Vollenweider, Effective connectivity changes in LSD-induced altered states of consciousness in humans, Proceeding of the National Academy of Science USA (2019), 116 (7): 2743–2748, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1815129116
VII. Christopher Timmermann, Leor Roseman, Michael Schartner, Raphael Milliere, Luke T. J. Williams, David Erritzoe, Suresh Muthukumaraswamy, Michael Ashton, Adam Bendrioua, Okdeep Kaur, Samuel Turton, Matthew M. Nour, Camilla M. Day, Robert Leech, David J. Nutt & Robin L. Carhart-Harris. Neural correlates of the DMT experience assessed with multivariate EEG. Sci Rep (2019), 9:16324, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-51974-4
VIII. Devin B.Terhune, Axel Cleeremans, Amir Raz, Steven Jay Lynn, Hypnosis and top-down regulation of consciousness, Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews (2017), 81, (Part A): 59-74, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.02.002
IX. Mathieu Landry, Michael Lifshitz, Amir Raz, Brain correlates of hypnosis: A systematic review and meta-analytic exploration, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 81 (2017) 75–98, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.02.020
X. David A. Oakley and Peter W. Halligan, Hypnotic suggestion: opportunities for cognitive neuroscience, Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2013), 14: 565-576, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3538
XI. Kieran C.R. Fox, Matthew L. Dixon, Savannah Nijeboer, Manesh Girn, James L. Floman, Michael Lifshitz, Melissa Ellamil, Peter Sedlmeier, Kalina Christoff, Functional neuroanatomy of meditation: A review and meta-analysis of 78 functional neuroimaging investigations, Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews (2016), 65: 208-228, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.03.021
XII. Yi-Yuan Tang, Britta K. Hölzel and Michael I. Posner, The neuroscience of mindfulness meditation, Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2015) 16, 213–225, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3916
XIII. Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne, and Richard J. Davidson, Meditation and the Neuroscience of Consciousness: An Introduction, in The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (2007), Edited by Philip David Zelazo, and Morris Moscovitch, pp 499-551 
Week 16
 12/25  Ego, Self and other vegetables – From Buddha to the Mad Travelers

So we are conscious. Or so we tend to believe. But if each of us is conscious, what is this conscious thing? What is this thing that, for it, it is like to be something or perceive something? In almost all modern cultures, this thing is called the self or ego. But does it exist? In this meeting, we will end our journey into the realm of consciousness by taking on some issues related to the ego and the self. We will discuss how the brain integrates information from multiple sensational sources to form one coherent experience. Subsequently, we will discuss what happens if the connections between the two parts of the brain get severed. Do we get one conscious entity or two? Next, we will continue to discuss theories of the self, from the ego theories to the bundle one. We will dwell on subjects like the Buddhist concept of the self, Freudian one, and more contemporary approaches. We will end the discussion with the issue of dissociation and Dissociative identity disorder. Does it exist? And if it does, what does it teach us about our normal conscious state.

Recommend advanced reading (not obligatory):
I. Charles Spence Sarah Squire, Multisensory Integration: Maintaining the Perception of Synchrony, Current Biology (2003), 13 (13): R519-R521, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0960-9822(03)00445-7
II. Yi-Chuan Chen and Charles Spence, Assessing the Role of the ‘Unity Assumption’ on Multisensory Integration: A Review, Frontiers in Psychology (2017), 8: 445, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00445
III. Michael S. Gazzaniga, Forty-five years of split-brain research and still going strong, Natue Reviews Neuroscience (2005), 6, 653–659 https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1723
IV. Yair Pinto, Edward H. Fde Haan, Victor A. F. Lamme, The Split-Brain Phenomenon Revisited: A Single Conscious Agent with Split Perception, Trends in cognitive sciences (2017), 21 (11): 835-851, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.09.003
V. Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Tends in cognitive sciences (2009), 13 (1): 7-13, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003
VI. Bernard J.Baars, Thomas Z.Ramsøy, StevenLaureys, Brain, conscious experience and the observing self, Trends in Neuroscience (2003), 26, (12): 671-675 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2003.09.015
VII. Antonio Damasio, The Feeling Of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (2000)
VIII. R. L. Carhart-Harris, K. J. Friston, The default-mode, ego-functions and free-energy: a neurobiological account of Freudian ideas, Brain (2010), 133 (4): 1265–1283, https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awq010
IX. Pengmin Qin, Georg Northoff, How is our self related to midline regions and the default-mode network (2011)? 57 (3): 1221-1233, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.028
X. Thomas Metzinger (2009), The ego tunnel : the science of the mind and the myth of the self
XI. Raphaël Millière, Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution, Frontiers Human Neuroscience (2017), 11: 245 https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245
XII. Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli Dorothé Legrand, Evan Thompson, Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience, Trends in cognitive sciences (2011) 15 (3): 104-112, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.01.001
XIII. William L. Mikulas, Buddhism and Western Psychology: Fundamentals of Integration,
Journal of Consciousness Studies (2007), 14(4), 4-49, https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-34247191973&partnerID=40&md5=0447e68473f39e05f967c6022cf0ec68
XIV. Ian Hacking , Mad Travelers, Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses (1999)
XV. Richard J. Loewenstein, Dissociation debates: everything you know is wrong, Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience (2018), 20 (3): 229-242, https://doi.org/10.31887/DCNS.2018.20.3/rloewenstein
XVI. Rebecca Seligman and Laurence J. Kirmayer, Dissociative Experience and Cultural Neuroscience: Narrative, Metaphor and Mechanism. Cult Med Psychiatry (2008), 32, 31–64, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-007-9077-8 
Week 17
 1/2  To be announced.

Depending on the number of participants, this meeting will either be devoted to the function of consciousness or to students presentations.